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THE PROBLEM OF GOOD INTENTIONS:
CHALLENGES ARISING FROM STATE
MANDATED UNIVERSITY-WIDE SEXUAL
MISCONDUCT REPORTING
ANDREW LITTLE, CHRIS RILEY* 1
Abstract
Legislatures and regulators struggle to create effective legal mechanisms to address the
misreporting and underreporting of sexual misconduct on college campuses. The problems
are clear: how does the law balance the desire to fully support victims of sexual misconduct
by providing access to supportive measures and complaint resolution options, while also
honoring the desire of some victims not to have private information shared with
others? While some employees have failed to report known instances of sexual misconduct
based on inappropriate grounds, others do so based on a desire to respect the victim’s
wishes. How should these problems, which may stem from organizational cultures, be
solved through legislation or regulation? Federal laws--Title IX and the Clery Act--impose
reporting duties on only some employees, based on their particular role, but beginning in
2019, the Texas Legislature went a step further and mandated university-wide sexual
misconduct reporting for all employees. The penalties for failure to report are
severe: termination and prosecution. While well-intentioned, this new Texas law
nevertheless creates many problems that undermine its effectiveness. We address Texas
Senate Bill 212 in its larger national context, offer several general critiques, highlight the
special problems associated with the application of the law at faith-based universities, and
make suggestions for university administrators and future legislative action in an attempt
to refine the scope of the law to better address the underreporting problem.
Key Words: mandated reporting, sexual misconduct, employee, state, Texas, Title IX,
Senate Bill 212
INTRODUCTION
Good intentions can make for bad policy. In this article we address
developments in Texas law related to the mandatory reporting of sexual
misconduct in university settings, framed by the background problems of
underreporting and misreporting on college campuses. In addition, we address
the relationship between the 2019 Texas statute and recent changes in Title IX
procedures. The Texas Legislature, understandably motivated by high-profile
incidents in the last few years where university employees failed to report or
address obvious instances of sexual misconduct, crafted new legislation in 2019
that may create as many problems as it solves. 2 The Legislature’s 2019 changes to
the Texas Education Code may have especially problematic application at faith1 * Andrew Little, J.D., is Associate Dean of Abilene Christian University’s College of Business
Administration, where he is also Associate Professor of Business Law. Chris Riley, J.D., is an
Associate Provost and a Deputy Title IX Coordinator as well as Assistant Professor in the Department
of Political Science and Criminal Justice at Abilene Christian University.
2 TEX. EDUC. CODE § 51.251 2020.
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based universities, even though it may have been a faith-based university that
generated the public outcry in the first place. While the problems of misreporting
or underreporting of sexual misconduct are real, significant, and in need of
redress, Texas Senate Bill 212 may be a blunt instrument that, in light of recent
changes in federal Title IX law, seems to be the wrong legislative tool for the job.
In his seminal 1986 article “Violence and the Word,” Robert Cover
observed that “Law is the projection of an imagined future upon reality.” 3 Those
with the power to effectuate the moral accomplishment that is the law—whether
judge, legislator, regulator, or litigant—implicitly imagine the world they want,
then use the legitimated force of the state—inseparable from violence, Cover
argues—to press down that idealized future upon the present. Sometimes the
future matches well with present conditions, and law “works.” Other times the
lawmaker identifies the right problem, but the reach into the future for a solution
misses the mark, as it cannot be easily projected onto the current reality.
The Texas Legislature correctly identified a weakness in existing legal
schemes related to unreported or misreported sexual misconduct. But the
imagined future has problematic application when pressed down upon the
present day, which we highlight herein. Specifically, this article addresses new
challenges for university employees in reporting sexual misconduct under Texas
law. Texas appears to be unique among all states in that the burden of reporting
sexual misconduct falls on virtually every employee of every higher education
institution, despite the fact that recently released Title IX regulations relax such
reporting requirements. In other words, the interplay between Title IX and state
higher education laws is in flux, with different lawmaking bodies seeking different
desired futures. The good intentions of this law may lead to bad policy when
applied to many routine situations in universities. These unforeseen applications
of the law to reality may be especially acute in faith-based institutions, which have
unique organizational cultures that are both strengths and weaknesses.
Significantly, although Title IX and some state legislatures may be moving away
from mandatory reporting for all employees, the Texas statute could serve as a
model for other states that seek to impose university-wide reporting, with severe
penalties for noncompliance. Thus, while this article is limited mainly to the Texas
statute in its context, we submit that this approach may be a realistic future for
other jurisdictions.
We begin our article by providing an overview and contextualization of
the Texas statute within the larger national landscape. Turning then to the text of
the statute and an understanding of how it will be applied, we offer several
critiques, both generally for all Texas universities and then specifically for faithbased institutions. We illustrate our critiques through the use of five hypothetical
cases, which bring to light the problematic text and scope of the Texas law.
Following these critiques and hypotheticals, we conclude with some suggested
changes for improvement, which take into account present conditions and
challenges, including the recently released Title IX regulations.

3

Robert Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1604 (1985–86).
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I.

SENATE BILL 212, IN CONTEXT

A. The Problems of University-Related Sexual Misconduct and Underreporting
Universities continue to struggle to eliminate the societal scourge of sexual
misconduct 4 within their academic communities. While no organization or social
institution is immune to these ills, universities may be particularly susceptible,
given their residential structure with thousands of people living in close quarters
and maintaining repeated interactions, pervasive late-adolescent culture with
reduced supervision and less than fully formed social skills, the prevalence of
alcohol and recreational drugs, and sometimes gross power disparities between
community participants. Indeed, few settings in twenty-first century America can
offer the same confluence of factors that fuel sexual misconduct as the
contemporary university. Universities understand these challenges and utilize
numerous tools to combat sexual misconduct, but research from the American
Association of Universities indicates that the rate of nonconsensual sexual contact
and misbehavior has actually increased since 2015, particularly when women are
victims. 5 From this perspective, university efforts to combat the problems appear
to be insufficient.
Layering an additional challenge on universities is the organizational
phenomenon arising from the widespread failure to report or underreport
incidents of assault and harassment. There are many instances in the last few years
where initial acts of sexual misconduct went unreported or were improperly
handled, which compounds the injury to the victim(s). Faith-based universities,
which are addressed specifically in Part III of this article, are not immune to the
problem of sexual misconduct and in some instances may offer high-profile
negative examples of organizational cultures that suppress reporting and
discipline. With this background, federal and state governments have created a
host of statutory obligations with the goal of eliminating or reducing sexual
misconduct in university settings as well as requiring greater reporting obligations
for those who become aware of violations. Based on these requirements, all
universities are required to have Title IX Coordinators as well as policies and
procedures for reporting that are disseminated to their students and employees.
Yet still, the problems of reporting persist.
It is within this milieu that Senate Bill 212 recently became the law in Texas
on September 1, 2019, adding reporting requirements for university employees
and mandating employee termination and prosecution for failure to report. We
start from the position that any failure to report sexual misconduct is a significant
problem worthy of attention and solution from university administrators, staff,
faculty, students, and other stakeholders. Likewise, while we applaud legislative
“Sexual misconduct” is not defined in the Texas statute but is a commonly used term of art that
includes sexual assault, sexual harassment, stalking, and dating violence. See the following training
materials from the Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board, Sexual Misconduct Policy (Dec. 2,
http://reportcenter.thecb.state.tx.us/Training-materials/handouts/Sexual-Misconduct2019),
Policy-Glossary/.
5 David Cantor et al., Report on the AAU Campus Climate Survey on Sexual Assault and Misconduct (Sept.
15,
2015),
AM.
ASS’N
OF
U.
vii–viii,
https://www.aau.edu/sites/default/files/%40%20Files/Climate%20Survey/AAU_Campus_Clim
ate_Survey_12_14_15.pdf.
4
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or regulatory action that addresses the root problems in these cases, we criticize
Senate Bill 212 as being inartfully drafted and difficult to apply in several common
instances. In other words, the statute identifies an important problem, but as we
explain, the solution creates additional new problems that are currently
unresolved.
B. Legislative Attempts in Some States to Address Sexual Misconduct
Investigations and Reporting
Texas lawmakers are not alone in their concerns related to sexual assault in the
higher education context. Other state legislatures have been active in defining and
delimiting how Title IX violations, sexual crimes, and sexual misconduct are
handled on college campuses within their states. Notably, Georgia and Missouri
have both attempted to create greater protections for universities and those
accused of sexual misconduct. In 2017 in Georgia, state Representative Earl
Ehrhart (R-Powder Springs) introduced a bill that would have required
universities to refer all incidents that could be crimes to law enforcement officials.
The university could pursue its own internal inquiry into the incident only if law
enforcement opened an investigation, and discipline against the accused could
occur only if the student was convicted or pled guilty. 6 The bill, Georgia HB 51,
passed the State House 115–55, but then was referred to committee in the Senate,
where it apparently died. 7
Missouri lawmakers in 2019 likewise introduced legislation that would protect
those accused of sexual misconduct in campus-based Title IX proceedings. Taking
the state House and Senate bills together, the accused would have extensive due
process rights, in addition to a statutory right of action against the university and
the initial claimant, and the state’s Attorney General could investigate universities
for failure to accord sufficient rights to the accused. 8 The Missouri bills were
placed on committee calendars, and nothing further appears to have happened
legislatively in the last twelve months. 9 Part of the reason for the bills’ failure to
generate action in the Legislature may have stemmed from the fact that the Kansas
City Star reported that the bills’ original author, a lobbyist, allegedly wrote the
proposed legislation to help his son, who had been expelled from a Missouri
university based on Title IX allegations. 10 These efforts, while ultimately
unavailing, stand in stark contrast to the Texas approach, described in detail
below. Notably, while Georgia and Missouri attempted in their proposed
legislation to ensure rights for the accused and limit a university’s ability to launch
Shannon McCaffrey & Janel Davis, Bill Would Restrict Colleges’ Response to Sexual Assault Reports,
ATLANTA J. CONST., Jan. 16, 2017, https://www.ajc.com/news/bill-would-restrict-collegesresponse-sexual-assault-reports/4hinoWnYROoCtMvQ1w9yWI/.
7 Georgia H.B. 51, “Postsecondary institutions; reporting and investigation of certain crimes by
officials and employees; provide manner,” Georgia General Assembly, 2017–2018 Regular Session,
http://www.legis.ga.gov/Legislation/en-US/display/20172018/HB/51.
8 Edward McKinley, Proposed Missouri Title IX Changes Would Give Accused More Power Than Any
other State, KANSAS CITY STAR, Jan. 30, 2019, https://www.kansascity.com/news/politicsgovernment/article225240190.html.
9
Missouri
Senate,
Senate
Bill
259,
https://www.senate.mo.gov/19info/BTS_Web/Bill.aspx?SessionType=R&BillID=1536359.
10 Alisa Nelson, Missouri Title IX Bill’s Fate Appears to Be Fading, MISSOURINET, Apr. 25, 2019,
https://www.missourinet.com/2019/04/25/missouri-title-ix-bills-fate-appears-to-be-fading/.
6
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its own investigation, no state has gone further than Texas in the other direction
in mandating university-wide reporting. 11
C. The Texas Approach, as Embodied by Senate Bill 212
During its 2019 biennial session, the Texas Legislature amended the Texas
Education Code to increase reporting obligations on university employees when
they become aware of sexual assault or harassment. Effective September 1, 2019,
the new law states as follows:
An employee of a postsecondary educational institution who, in the
course and scope of employment, witnesses or receives information
regarding the occurrence of an incident that the employee
reasonably believes constitutes sexual harassment, sexual assault,
dating violence, or stalking and is alleged to have been committed
by or against a person who was a student enrolled at or an employee
of the institution at the time of the incident shall promptly report the
incident to the institution's Title IX coordinator or deputy Title IX
coordinator. 12
Employees who fail to report under the statute are subject to two sanctions.
First, their failure is a class B misdemeanor (or class A misdemeanor if the
employee concealed the underlying incident); 13 and second, the university “shall
terminate the employment” of employees who fails to report. 14 To avoid criminal
punishment and termination, employees must report “all information concerning
the incident known to [them] that is relevant to the investigation, and if applicable,
redress of the incident,” regardless of when or where it occurred and how the
employees learned the information. 15
There are modified reporting requirements for certain employees, including (1)
employees designated by the institution as confidential resources for students, (2)
employees who receive the information under circumstances that render the
employees’ communications confidential or privileged “under other law,” and (3)
employees who receive information in the course or scope of their employment as
health care, mental health, or medical providers. Still, in these incidents, the
confidential or privileged employees are mandated to report that an incident
occurred but may not include any information that would violate an expectation
of privacy, absent consent to do so. 16 For example, if a student seeing a licensed
professional counselor in the university’s counseling center revealed he or she had
been raped by a fellow student, the counselor would be required to disclose that
information (but not the student’s identity) to the Title IX Coordinator. Finally, the
reporting requirement does not apply at all if the information was disclosed at a

Andrew Kreighbaum, States Wade into Title IX Debate, INSIDE HIGHER ED, June 19, 2019,
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2019/06/19/texas-legislation-contrasts-devos-takecampus-sexual-misconduct.
12 Tex. Educ. Code § 51.252(a) 2020.
13 Tex. Educ. Code § 51.255(b) 2020.
14 Id. § 51.255(c).
15 19 Tex. Admin. Code § 3.5(a–b) 2020.
16 Id. § 3.5(c).
11
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public awareness event sponsored by the institution of an affiliated student
organization. 17
While there is some existing commentary on Texas Senate Bill 212, this
article’s limited inquiry arises from three contextual frames. 18 We first consider
the Texas reporting requirements in light of federal reporting requirements as set
out in Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 and its recently released
regulations (Title IX) as well as the Jeanne Clery Disclosure of Campus Security
Policy and Campus Crime Statistics Act (Clery Act). 19 Next, we explore potential
problems for all Texas universities posed by Senate Bill 212. For example, Senate
Bill 212 imposes Draconian penalties for university employees who may not report
misconduct because of good faith misunderstandings or lack of knowledge of
context. Finally, we explore the unique challenges faced by faith-based
institutions in engaging in best practices with these layered legal schemes. In
particular, Senate Bill 212 fails to consider how issues related to privileged
communications might play out in faith-based institutions, and ignores the
sometimes-unique nature of organizational cultures at religious colleges and
universities. We add to the literature by providing not only analysis of these
issues, but also a few hypothetical illustrative case studies that will hopefully
provoke further reflection and discussion before concluding with our own
recommendations. This article is the first in-depth application of the law and
commentary on the clergy privilege to Senate Bill 212 in the context of faith-based
institutions.
D. Texas Senate Bill 212 in Larger Statutory and Regulatory Context
1. Title IX and Its New Regulations
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 contains prohibitions on sex
discrimination in higher education that are well known by most in the academic
and higher education law communities. The general statement of the law is clear:
“No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under
any education program or activity receiving federal financial assistance.” 20 In
multiple cases, courts have explained that sexual harassment and sexual assault
can result in discrimination under Title IX, for which educational institutions can
be held civilly liable. 21 On May 6, 2020, the Department of Education (or
Department) released new regulations adapting those standards to an
administrative enforcement context. The new regulations articulate institutional
responsibilities as follows:
A [university] with actual knowledge of sexual harassment in an
education program or activity of the [university] against a person in
the United Stated, must respond promptly in a manner that is not
Id. § 3.5(d).
For an overview of some of the commentary related to Senate Bill 212, see Kreighbaum, supra note
10.
19 20 U.S.C. §§1681 - 1688 (1986).34 C.F.R. pt. 106(2020); 34 C.F.R. § 668.46 (2014).
20 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a).
21 Gebser v. Lago Vista Ind. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274 (1998); Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Ed., 526
U.S. 629 (1999).
17
18
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dilliberatly indeferent. A [university] is deliberately indifferent only
if its response to sexual harassment is clearly unreasonable in light of
known circumstances. 22
This actual knowledge standard replaced the former “know or reasonably should
know” standard that existed prior to the new regulations. Under the old standard,
a university had notice if a responsible employee “knew, or in the exercise of
reasonable care should have known,” about the harassment.” 23
Prior Title IX guidance defined a “responsible employee” as (1) an
employee that has actual authority to take action to redress the harassment, (2) an
employee who has the duty to report to appropriate school officials sexual
harassment or any other misconduct by students or employees, or (3) an
individual who a student could reasonably believe has this authority or
responsibility. 24 Therefore, based on that prior guidance, many institutions
adopted institutional policies that clearly defined and designated responsible
employees. Some of these policies designate all employees at the institution as
responsible employees, while others excluded certain portions (e.g., faculty) from
their definition in an attempt to reduce liability and reporting obligations.
Now, under the new Title IX regulations, “Actual knowledge means notice
of sexual harassment or allegations of sexual harassment to the Title IX
Coordinator or any [university official] who has authority to institute corrective
measures on behalf of the [university].” 25 As a justification for this limitation, the
Department of Education points to the need for a uniform approach that is
“aligned with the standards developed by the Supreme Court in cases assessing
liability under Title IX for money damages in private litigation.” 26 Instead of
focusing on the behavior of individual “third parties” like university faculty, the
new regulations tie liability under Title IX to the university’s deliberate
indifference arising from “an official decision by the [university] not to remedy the
violation.” 27 Specifically, the regulations’ Preamble explains in this regard
Because Title IX is a statute ‘designed primarily to prevent recipients
of Federal financial assistance from using the funds in a discriminatory
manner,’ it is a recipient’s own misconduct—not the sexually harassing
behavior of employees, students, or other third parties—that subjects
the recipient to liability in a private lawsuit under Title IX, and the

34 C.F.R. § 106.44(a) (2020).
Office for Civil Rights, Revised Sexual Harassment Guidance, 66 Fed. Reg. 5512 (Jan. 19, 2001),
https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/shguide.pdf [hereinafter 2001 Guidance].
24 Id. at 13. Whether a student reasonably believed an individual has the requisite authority or
responsibility depended on a variety of factors including the student’s age and education, position
held by the individual, and the school’s formal and informal practices and procedures. Id. at 33û34,
n.74.
25 34 C.F.R. § 106.30(a) [2020 (differentiating between elementary and secondary schools, where
actual knowledge means notice of sexual harassment or allegations of sexual harassment to any
employee).
26 Id.
27 Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Ed., 526 U.S. 629, 642 (1999). (stating that actual knowledge ensures
that liability arises from “an official decision by the recipient not to remedy the violation”) (citing
Gebser v. Lago Vista Ind. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 290 (1998) .
22
23
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recipient cannot commit its own misconduct unless the recipient first
knows of the sexual harassment that needs to be addressed. 28
The rules go even further to reduce an institution’s burden to respond by
(1) narrowing the definition of what constitutes a violation by requiring that sexual
harassment be “severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive,” and (2) limiting
application of Title IX to incidents occurring only in an education program or
activity of the recipient university. 29 While the Department acknowledges that
determining who is an official to whom notice of sexual harassment gives actual
knowledge to the recipient will be fact specific, it is clear that the notice
requirement does not apply generally to all university employees like it does in
the K–12 or Texas contexts. 30
It is also worth noting that the Texas Legislature and Department of
Education have adopted different definitions of sexual harassment as its relates to
traditional hostile environment claims, with Texas only requiring that the
unwelcomed, sex-based conduct (1) be “sufficiently severe, persistent, or
pervasive”, in the educational context; or (2) “create an intimidating, hostile or
offensive work environment.” 31 As noted above, Title IX’s new regulations define
sexual harassment as conduct that is “severe, pervasive, and objectively
offensive.” 32 Moreover, unlike TItle IX, Texas law does not limit reports to those
incidents occurring in the course and scope of university programs. This means,
in effect, that university employees in Texas are required to report off-campus and
nonuniversity-affiliated conduct, extending their obligations beyond those of K–
12 employees under Title IX.
The Department of Education explains that drawing a distinction between
K–12 and college employees is necessary, because “[e]lementary and secondary
schools generally operate under the doctrine of in loco parentis, under which the
school stands ‘in the place of a parent,’ and universities do not.” 33 In this way, the
new Title IX regulations “allow [universities] to decide which of their employees
must, may, or must only with a student’s consent, report sexual harassment to the
recipient’s Title IX Coordinator.” 34 According to the Department, this change was
necessary because prior guidance, which established vicarious liability for
universities based on the constructive knowledge of employees, “unintentionally
discouraged disclosures or reports of sexual harassment by leaving complainants
with too few options for disclosing sexual harassment to an employee without
automatically triggering a [university] response.” 35 Instead, the Department
acknowledges that university students “benefit from having options to disclose
sexual harassment to college and university employees who may keep the
disclosure confidential,” and “retaining control over whether, and when, [they]
want the [university] to respond to the sexual harassment.” 36 In fact, the
34 C.F.R. § 106 (Supplementary Material at 47) 2020.
34 C.F.R. § 106.30(a) and 106.44(a) (emphasis added) 2020.
30 34 C.F.R. § 106.30(a).
31 TEX. EDUC. CODE § 51.251(5) 2020 (emphasis added).
32 34 C.F.R. § 106.30(a) (emphasis added).
33 34 C.F.R. § 106 (Supplementary Material at 52–53).
34 Id. at 54.
35 Id. at 54.
36 Id. at 55.
28
29
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Department contends that “institutional betrayal may occur when an institution’s
mandatory reporting policies require a complainant’s intended private
conversation about sexual assault to result in a report to the Title IX
Coordinator.” 37
To summarize, here are some key differences between the new 2020
regulations for Title IX and Texas’s Senate Bill 212. First, Title IX focuses on the
action or inaction of the university as a whole, while Senate Bill 212 focuses on the
behavior of individual employees. Second, Title IX and Senate Bill 212 use
different definitions of sexual harassment, with the notable change of the
conjunctive “and” in Title IX to the disjunctive “or” in Senate Bill 212. And third,
the Department of Education appears to rest some of its analysis on concerns
related to institutional betrayal that could arise in some student confidential
communications, whereas the Texas Legislature evinced no such unease with how
a mandatory reporting requirement would affect confidential communications
(other than in cases involving professional relationships and legal privileges, as
described in Part III.B.).
2. The Clery Act and the University Reporting of Criminal Conduct
The Clery Act is a federal criminal reporting law that requires institutions
to collect and publicly report statistics on crimes that occur on and around campus
property. 38 The Clery Act only establishes limited reporting obligations based on
specific roles in the institution. Specifically, the Clery Act imposes a duty on
“Campus Security Authorities” to report fifteen different crimes (including sexbased offenses) to designated university officials, typically campus law
enforcement. 39 A Campus Security Authority (or CSA) is defined by the Act’s
regulations as, “An official of an institution who has significant responsibility for
student and campus activities, including, but not limited to, student housing,
student discipline, and campus judicial proceedings.” 40 According to the
Department of Education’s Handbook for Campus Safety and Security Reporting (or
Clery Handbook), an “official” is “any person who has the authority and the duty
to take action or respond to particular issues on behalf of the institution.” 41 This
can include faculty members so long as they are also officials with significant
responsibility for student and campus activities beyond teaching. Examples
provided in the Clery Handbook include faculty advising student organizations
or members of a sexual response team. Moreover, the Clery Handbook specifically

Id. at 62 and 313. (Citing Carly Parnitzke Smith & Jennifer J. Freyd, Dangerous Safe Havens:
Institutional Betrayal Exacerbates Sexual Trauma, 26 JOURNAL OF TRAUMATIC STRESS 1, 120 (2013)
(describing “institutional betrayal” as when an important institution, or a segment of it, acts in a way
that betrays its member’s trust); Merle H. Weiner, Legal Counsel for Survivors of Campus Sexual
Violence, 29 YALE J. L. & FEMINISM 123, 140–41 (2017) (identifying one type of institutional betrayal as
the harm that occurs when “the survivor thinks she is speaking to a confidential resource, but then
finds out the advocate cannot keep their conversations private”).
38 20 U.S.C. § 1092(f) 2009.
39 34 C.F.R. § 668.46 2014. This requirement also applies to campus security and law enforcement
personnel.
40 34 C.F.R. § 668.46(a)(iv).
41 John B King, The Handbook for Campus Safety and Security Reporting The Handbook for Campus Safety
and
Security
Reporting
(2016),
U.S.
Dep’t
of
Educ.,
https://www2.ed.gov/admins/lead/safety/handbook.pdf [hereinafter Clery Handbook].
37
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excludes “a faculty member who does not have any responsibility for student and
campus activity beyond the classroom.” 42
Even if staff or faculty members qualify as CSAs, the Clery Handbook
makes it clear that they are only responsible to report alleged crimes that are
reported to them in their capacities as CSAs:
CSAs are not responsible for . . . reporting incidents that they
overhear students talking about in a hallway conversation; that a
classmate or student mentions during an in-class discussion; that a
victim mentions during a speech, workshop, or any other form of
group presentation; or that the CSA otherwise learns about in an
indirect manner. 43
This is particularly significant, given the ways indirect information flows
around tight-knit communities like universities. Moreover, unlike the Texas
reporting requirements in Senate Bill 212, the Clery Handbook acknowledges that
CSA reporting responsibilities can “usually be met without disclosing personally
identifying information,” which allows victims to maintain confidentiality and ask
the CSA to report only relevant details needed to meet reporting and timely
warning requirements (as opposed to pursue criminal or administrative
investigations). 44
Similar to Senate Bill 212, the Clery Act includes a specific exclusion for the
role of a professional counselor whose “professional responsibilities include
providing mental health counseling to members of the institution's community
and who is functioning within the scope.” 45 However, where the Act differs from
Senate Bill 212 is that it also provides an exclusion for “pastoral counselors,” who
are described as “a person who is associated with a religious order or
denomination, is recognized by that religious order or denomination as someone
who provides confidential counseling, and is functioning within the scope of that
recognition as a pastoral counselor.” 46 Note that unlike the definition of
professional counselor, the definition of pastoral counselor does not mention the
staff or faculty member’s actual professional responsibilities, indicating that one
might be considered a pastoral counselor even if that is not part of the person’s job
with the university. Still, the Clery Handbook states, “if your institution has an
individual with dual roles, one as a professional or pastoral counselor and the
other as an official who qualifies as a CSA, and the roles cannot be separated, that
individual is considered a campus security authority and is obligated to report
Clery Act crimes.” 47

Id. at 4–4.
Id. at 4–5.
44 Id. at 4–8. See also 34 C.F.R. § 668.46(c)(2)(i) (“Clery Act reporting does not require initiating an
investigation or disclosing personally identifying information about the victim”).
45 Id.
46 Id. (Cf. Professional counselor. A person whose official responsibilities include providing mental
health counseling to members of the institution's community and who is functioning within the
scope of the counselor's license or certification. 34 C.F.R. § 668.46(a)(iv).)
47 Clery Handbook, supra note 40, at 4–8.
42
43
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II.

THE CHALLENGES OF APPLYING SENATE BILL 212 IN TEXAS
UNIVERSITIES

The goal of the new Texas law is easy to understand and, in most cases,
would not present complicating circumstances. There are obvious instances when
a university employee—perhaps a faculty member or an assistant coach—finds
out either from a student or from another source that sexual misconduct has taken
place, and in those instances the employee must report what was learned to the
institution’s Title IX Coordinator. Yet a reporting obligation that seems simple in
principle includes several facets that complicate the issue considerably. These
complications arise from multiple assumed preconditions that Senate Bill 212
appears to take for granted. As with many laws, “the devil is in the details,” so to
speak, which leads to an assessment of the law as well intentioned but highly
problematic.
A. Employment Status May Not Match University Reality
One complication in the statute is the potential for confusion about who is
covered. By its text, Senate Bill 212 says that the person who receives information
about an incident of sexual misconduct must be an “employee” of the institution.
Does this precondition for the statute’s application exclude independent
contractors? A strictly textual reading is not unreasonable, given that “employee”
and “independent contractor” are separate categories of the work relationship
under both federal 48 and state 49 law, and the inclusion of one category could be
read to exclude the other. 50 There is a heightened sense of awareness in
legislatures around the country related to the employee/contractor distinction in
the gig economy, 51 and it is possible—though by no means certain—that the Texas
Legislature intended to only include employees within the scope of the statute.
One way to gauge the significance of the textual exclusion of independent
contractors is to consider whether adjunct and contingent faculty are viewed as
employees or contractors at a given higher education institution. Having a parttime academic appointment at a university or college can be accomplished either
through an employment or independent contractor arrangement. If independent
contractors are excluded, and if adjunct faculty are viewed as contractors, then a
sizeable percentage of a given university’s teaching staff may not have any
reporting obligations. This exclusion is potentially significant, given that the
American Association of University Professors estimates that approximately forty
percent of all faculty in American higher education institutions are part time. 52
Part-time faculty rates are disproportionately high at masters-level, baccalaureate,
and associate-degree institutions, with nearly seventy percent of faculty

See e.g., Publication 1779 (Rev. 3-2012), DEP’T OF TREASURY INTERNAL REVENUE SERV.,
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p1779.pdf.
49 See generally TEX. LABOR CODE § 201, Subchapters D and E (2018) (defining employment and listing
numerous exceptions thereto).
50 The classic Latin expression for this canon of construction is expressio unius est exclusio alterius. See
Brooks v. Northglen Assoc., 141 S.W.3d 158, 168 (Tex. 2004).
51 CAL. LABOR CODE § 2750.3 (2020)
52 Data Snapshot: Contingent Faculty in US Higher Ed, AM. ASS’N OF U. PROFESSORS, Oct. 11, 2018,
https://www.aaup.org/news/data-snapshot-contingent-faculty-us-higher-ed#.Xgpb95NKiLt).
48

258

At faith-based
appointments being part-time at community colleges. 53
institutions, a situation described below in Part III, some of these contract workers
may also be employed at churches such as instructors in religion courses. The
problematic presumption that the person with the reporting obligation has
employment status gives rise to the first simple hypothetical:
Hypothetical Example #1
A university hires an adjunct faculty member to teach a course in the business
school. The adjunct is a local entrepreneur with a growing company, and one of
the students in class has had an off-campus job at the company for two years.
While at work one day, the student tells the adjunct faculty member about a
sexual assault of which she is aware that occurred at an off-campus party. The
student asks her boss at work (the adjunct faculty member) not to tell anyone,
because her friend (the victim, who is also a student at the same university) is
unsure she wants to press charges. The entrepreneur/adjunct professor strongly
encourages the student employee to tell her friend to call the police but does not
make a report to the university’s Title IX office. Is the adjunct faculty member an
“employee” under Senate Bill 212 such that a report to the Title IX office is
required? The determination of whether a worker is an employee or independent
contractor is highly fact specific, with labels and titles being viewed as evidence
of one status or the other but not determinative. Therefore, even if a university
calls its adjunct faculty contractors (or employees), it does not mean they in fact
would be classified as such by the IRS, Department of Labor, or state workforce
commission. Thus, how much of a fact-intensive inquiry is an adjunct faculty
member supposed to make into their own status? And what level of legal
sophistication is necessary for the adjunct faculty member to know that employee
versus contractor status is a hotly contested topic in general? Finally, was the
report made to the adjunct instructor in the course and scope of employment
(addressed in Part III.C in the context of faith-based institutions)? Or was it made
in the context of a part-time employee’s discussion with her boss? What if the
discussion between student and adjunct professor happened after class one day
in a hallway in the business school and not onsite at the company where the
student has a part-time job? Does the location of the report to the adjunct faculty
member change its status?
Virtually all universities utilize an adjunct pool, and some may not have
well-defined relationships with their adjuncts in terms of contract specificity. In
addition, universities (and even departments within universities) vary
considerably in terms of onboarding and training of adjuncts, and levels of
support and supervision provided to adjuncts. Given the impossibility of
describing the adjunct or contingent faculty relationship to a given university with
precision, the limitation in Senate Bill 212 to “employees” could prove problematic
in some contexts where the relationship is unclear or where adjunct faculty are
explicitly independent contractors.
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B. The Reasonable Belief Requirement Expects Too Much from Employees
The reporting obligation under Texas Senate Bill 212 only arises if the
university employee reasonably believes the incident at issue constitutes sexual
harassment, as defined by Texas law, or sexual assault, dating violence, or
stalking, as defined by the Clery Act. 54 This condition is potentially more
problematic in application than the inquiry as to whether a given worker at a
university is an employee, given the factual specificity of what constitutes such
violations and the varying levels of legal sophistication of university employees,
not to mention the competing definitions of sexual harassment under Texas law
and the new Title IX regulations. While sexual assault, dating violence, and
stalking derive their definitions from the federal Clery Act, 55 sexual harassment is
defined in the Texas statute this way:
“Sexual harassment” means unwelcome, sex-based verbal or physical
conduct that: (A) in the employment context, unreasonably interferes
with a person’s work performance or creates an intimidating, hostile, or
offensive work environment; or (b) in the education context, is
sufficiently severe, persistent, or pervasive that the conduct interferes
with a student’s ability to participate in or benefit from educational
programs or activities at a postsecondary educational institution. 56
This legislative text belies a larger problem, however, given that the
statute’s language appears to derive from verbiage in hundreds of
sexual harassment cases under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
over the past several decades, which are a manifestation of the factdependent nature of these sorts of inquiries.
An in-depth analysis of trends in sexual harassment law under Title VII is
beyond the scope of this article, but a superficial summary of the employment law
subfield highlights the challenges faced by university employees who are
contemplating whether to report what they heard to their school’s Title IX office.
To begin, in 1993 the Supreme Court announced its definition of sexual
harassment in the foundational case of Harris v. Forklift Systems. In that case, the
Court held that “discriminatory conduct was so severe or pervasive that it created
a work environment abusive to employees because of their . . . gender.” 57 About
a decade later, the Court again stated that plaintiffs in sexual harassment cases
“must show harassing behavior sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the
conditions of [their] employment.” 58 Countless cases from around the country
have repeated this language, yet courts still lament that “drawing the line between
what is and is not objectively hostile is not always easy.” 59 This is because two of
the factors necessary to establish a sexual harassment case in the employment
context are that 91) the plaintiff/victim subjectively believed the misconduct
created an abusive work environment; and (2) a reasonable person would
objectively agree with the plaintiff’s subjective belief. Given the objective,
reasonable person standard implied in this parallel law, a determination of
54
55
56
57
58
59

TEX. EDUC. CODE § 51.252(a) (2020)
20 U.S.C. § 1092(f) (2009).
Tex. Educ. Code § 51.251(5) (2020)
Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22 (1993).
Pennsylvania State Police v. Suder, 542 U.S. 129, 133 (2004) (internal quotations omitted).
Turner v. The Saloon, Ltd., 595 F.3d 679, 685 (7th Cir. 2010) (internal quotations omitted).
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whether conduct is so severe or pervasive as to interfere with either a person’s
employment or their educational attainment or participation under Texas Senate
Bill 212 is highly dependent on facts and context. At a minimum, whether
particular conduct in an organization rises to the level of sexual harassment is a
mixed question of law and fact. 60 Title VII is not designed to be a civility code for
the workplace, 61 and it is likely that Title IX and Texas Senate Bill 212 are likewise
not designed to be civility codes for universities, so determining which behavior
is merely uncivil, boorish, or offensive, and which behavior has an interfering
effect with one’s employment or education, often requires a jury determination.
In light of this dependence on context, how are typical university
employees to know whether the information that is witnessed or learned by them
in the course of their employment is actually sexual harassment? Consider the
following questions in the next hypothetical.
Hypothetical Example #2
Is one rude or sexist comment between employees or students sufficient to
trigger a reporting obligation under Texas Senate Bill 212? If the isolated
comment was the basis of an employment case under Title VII, there would
likely be no finding of actionable harassment. Yet if a university employee
overhears one student making a rude or sexist comment to another student in a
common area or on social media, does Senate Bill 212 mandate that it be reported
to the Title IX office? In one section, the statute seems to contemplate “an
incident” that puts the university on notice that sexual misconduct has occurred.
“An incident” seems to indicate that a single isolated event can trigger a
reporting obligation. But the definition of sexual harassment within the
statutory text appears to work in the opposite direction, where a single incident
would have to be unusually severe in order to fit the definition in the Texas law.
Assuming for the sake of argument that single, isolated comments that are
offensive but not severe do not give rise to sexual harassment discrimination
under the Texas statute, in order for a reasonable belief of sexual harassment to
exist, the employee would need to know about the context of any prior
relationship between the two students. 62 For example, is this the first and only
time such a comment was made? If so, then while offensive, it does not seem as
though it would rise to the level of the harassment definition in Senate Bill 212.
Or is the overheard comment yet one more instance in a long litany of abuse
from an antagonistic and misogynistic classmate? It would be impossible to
know without asking. If employees choose not to report based on their own lack
of knowledge of the context, should they be terminated?
Some cases will be easy; others will be almost impossible. The conscientious
employee who witnesses or is given information about an incident may be inclined
to always report, because the legislative threats (termination and prosecution) are
60 Shira Scheindlen & John Elofson, Judges, Juries, and Sexual Harassment, 17 YALE L. & PO’Y REV. 813,
815 (1998).
61 Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 787–88 (1998).
62 Some courts have ruled that a single, isolated incident will suffice. See, e.g., Feingold v. New York,
366 F.3d 138, 150 (2d Cir. 2004) (“[A] single act can create a hostile work environment if it in fact
work[s] a transformation of the plaintiff's workplace.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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severe. It may be that overreporting was both foreseen by the Legislature and
preferable to underreporting, but it is a phenomenon that is not without
organizational problems, noted below in Part II.E.
C. Lack of Time Limits on Incidents That Trigger Reporting Obligations
It is worth noting that Texas Senate Bill 212 contains no time limit on reporting
instances in the distant past (despite the fact that Title IX now permits a
discretionary dismissal for complaints against respondents who are no longer
enrolled or employed by the institution). The challenge of a lack of temporal limits
is illustrated by the following hypothetical.
Hypothetical Example #3
A long-term employee is discussing her department’s work environment with
a colleague across campus. She notes that it is much better now, but that her
work conditions were almost unbearable back in the 1990s when a particular
administrator repeatedly sexually harassed several of his direct reports,
including the long-term employee. The harassing administrator left the
university soon after the harassment (more than twenty-plus years ago), and
no further adverse action has ensued. The long-term employee never
mentioned the situation to anyone in the human resources (HR) department,
because the administrator left on his own accord, and the situation improved
dramatically. Does Texas Senate Bill 212 require the colleague who hears this
story from the 1990s to report it to the university’s Title IX Coordinator? If the
person who hears the communication does not report the information because
they view the matter as long-since resolved, should they still be terminated
and prosecuted?
It seems absurd to require reporting of incidents from the distant past, which were
either already remedied or which are now incapable of remediation due to lack of
jurisdiction, statute of limitations, or significant change in university or
employment conditions, yet that is what the Texas statute appears to require.
D. Lack of Due Process Protections for Employees
Another problematic point in the statute is that it contains no due process
protections for employees accused of failing to report. Employees at public higher
education institutions have some constitutional due process rights in their
employment status, but faculty and staff at private institutions have no such
protections. 63 While the statute and its regulations take pains to protect the
procedural and confidentiality interests of victims, witnesses, and even alleged
perpetrators, 64 there are no such protections for employees who fail to report (save
a reference in the rules to the termination decision being made “in accordance with
the institution’s disciplinary procedure”). 65 Thus, the private university employee
is left in the most precarious position of all under Senate Bill 212, especially if the
For public employee due process rights, see generally Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972),
and Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
64 19 Tex. Admin. Code §§ 3.10 and 3.16 (2020).
65 19 Tex. Admin. Code § 3.8 (2020)
63
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university’s disciplinary process does not specifically address these issues and/or
relies heavily on at-will termination. In a situation where the punishment seems
far out of proportion to the offense (such as a situation described in Hypothetical
#3), the lack of due process protections become even more egregious an omission.
We address due process in our suggestions for statutory improvement in Part IV.
E. Changes to Organizational Culture in Higher Education Institutions
The new reporting requirements are already raising concerns stemming
from the way they are expected to change organizational culture in Texas colleges
and universities. For example, the American Association of University Professors
raised the following concerns when discussing the potential for federally
mandated reporting requirements for all faculty:
Mandatory reporting policies have a strong and negative impact on college and
university faculty members, given their teaching and advising relationships with
students. After having a disturbing experience that may constitute sexual
harassment, a student often goes to a trusted faculty member to discuss the
experience and to seek advice . . . The faculty member’s ability to be helpful to the
student depends on the trusting nature of the relationship, where the faculty
member is able to be a sounding board, to help the student think through various
options, and to respect the student’s choice about whether and how to respond to
the situation . . . Such overly broad policies compel faculty members to violate
confidentiality in their relationships with students. 66
Moreover, while it is true that there will be an initial spike in reporting
based on this new requirement, this seems to meet the underlying purpose of the
statute. As Texas college students increasingly become aware that nothing that
they share with faculty members will remain confidential, it is likely that reporting
to faculty and staff will go down over time (especially in the most serious cases of
sexual assault where students are afraid for others to find out about what
happened). Additionally, the fact that faculty and staff are required by Texas law
to report this information to the Title IX Coordinator will likely result in faculty
being more focused on their reporting obligations (and avoiding punishment)
than caring for the needs of those harmed. The punitive and ambiguous nature of
these new requirements may even push some faculty and staff to distance
themselves from students in situations where such a report feels imminent. In
other words, in a time where students need the support of faculty and staff most,
these new requirements are erecting barriers of fear and juridification that will
have an adverse effect on victims.
Finally, the overreporting that will occur, for example, when faculty and
staff incorrectly report incidents of sexual assault that occurred prior to students
attending college, creates a burden on already taxed Title IX offices. Ideally, Title
IX offices would be focusing primarily on prevention and those complaints of
sexual misconduct coming directly from students that need and want help from
66
Risa L Lieberwitz & Anita Levy, Comment in Department of Education Proposed Rule:
Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs and Activities Receiving Federal Financial
Assistance 34 CFR 106 (2019), (Jan. 28, 2019), AM. ASS’N OF U. PROFESSORS,
https://www.aaup.org/sites/default/files/AAUP%20Comments-Title-IX-Regulations-28January-2019-0.pdf.
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the Title IX administrators. However, under this new requirement, overreporting
by faculty and staff requires that the Title IX office chase down reports where
students never wanted help beyond talking to someone they trust. In other words,
the mandatory reporting requirement actually reduces the capacity of Title IX
offices.
III.

TEXAS SENATE BILL 212 MAY POSE UNFORESEEN PROBLEMS IN
FAITH-BASED INSTITUTIONS

Texas has a thriving segment of faith-based or faith-affiliated, higher education
institutions.
The no-profit association ICUT—Independent Colleges and
Universities of Texas—has forty regular and affiliate members, of which
approximately thirty-three have either a present or historic connection to a faith
tradition. 67 Current ties or identification with a denomination or tradition vary
widely, but many of those thirty-three schools offer some level of religious
educational context and support on their campuses and in their classes. Thus, it is
worthwhile to consider how the statute plays out in those institutions that may
have unique and distinguishing missions and cultures.
A. Senate Bill 212 May Not Remedy the Problems in Organizational Culture
That Gave Rise to the Statute in the First Place
The organizational cultures of some faith-based (or faith-affiliated) higher
education institutions reflect a different light on their engagement and compliance
with Title IX. In fact, it may be that the distinct campus cultures at faith-based
institutions are partially to blame for underreporting sexual misconduct. For
instance, in a well-known negative example, Baylor University’s implementation
of Title IX best practices was hampered by, in the words of the university’s board
of regents, “existing barriers to reporting on Baylor’s campus, including the impact
of other campus policies regarding the prohibition of alcohol and extra-marital
sexual intercourse.” 68 Some religious universities that maintain strict behavioral
controls through misconduct policies operate—perhaps like prescandal Baylor—
with an attitude that sexual assault and harassment “‘doesn’t happen here,’” and
students may fear reporting incidents because of concerns about victim blaming,
or that victims or witnesses will be implicated in code of conduct violations.69
While the Texas Legislature amended the Education Code in 2017 to protect
students from disciplinary action when their report of sexual misconduct
implicates them in a code of conduct violation, the stigma of being associated with
prohibited conduct in faith-based universities (such as sex outside of marriage or
alcohol or drug use) may be sufficient disincentive to report. 70 Senate Bill 212,
however, does not resolve the underlying tension created by university cultures
that deny that bad things can happen there; in fact, the law may exacerbate the
problem.

Indep. C. and U. of Tex., List of Institutions, https://www.icut.org/our-schools/list-ofinstitutions/ [Au: June 24, 2020].
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69 Id. at 8.
70 TEX. EDUC. CODE § 51.9366(b) (2020)
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Part of the tension for faith-based colleges and universities arises from the
nature of the relationship between students and employees. In centuries past,
universities were viewed as guarantors of the safety and moral development of
their students under the theory of in loco parentis. 71 Slowly, over the course of the
twentieth century, the old doctrine of in loco parentis as a tort standard disappeared
from American higher education law, to no one’s great disappointment. 72 Some
commentators note that the present understanding of how much student safety is
guaranteed is more a matter of university culture and attitude, rather than a legal
requirement. 73 Others suggest that the replacement schemes for universities’
relationships with their students are more closely akin to contractual notions of
consumer transactions. 74 Instead of the paternalism required by in loco parentis,
Douglas Goodman and Susan Silbey now suggest that at present, the university
and student have something like a business relationship, such as a consumer
transaction or tenancy. 75
This default understanding of a consumer or business transaction creates
tensions within faith-based institutions, 76 which often use cultural language that
describes a less transactional, more holistic and multidimensional conception of
the relationship between student and institution, based typically on notions of
Christian love and well-being. (The extent to which these slogans transcend
rhetoric and manifest themselves in concrete structures and actions likely varies.)
For instance, Baylor University’s mission statement declares that the institution
integrates “academic excellence and Christian commitment within a caring
community.” 77 Continuing, the university says that, “At Baylor, ‘Love thy
neighbor’ are not just words...they are a way of life.” 78 Likewise, St. Mary’s
University in San Antonio is part of the Marianist congregation and approach to
education, which includes, among other things, the following commitments and
characteristics: “Faculty, staff, and students work together to form a community
of learning in service to the common good of all attending to both the formal and
informal dimensions of education…. Community calls us to ... form mutual
relationships of service and love with one another in the pursuit of our mission.” 79
Other examples abound, which, when combined and abstracted, seem to reveal a
71 See, e.g,. Pratt v. Wheaton Coll., 40 Ill. 186 (1866) (upholding the right of a private college to expel
a student for joining a secret society).
72 See e.g. Bradshaw v. Rawlings, 612 F.2d 135 (3d Cir. 1979) (refusing to hold Delaware State College
liable for the injuries to a student who was injured by another student following a college-sponsored
party where underage drinking had occurred).
73 Vimal Patel, The New ‘In Loco Parentis’: Why Colleges Are Keeping a Closer Eye on Their Students’
Lives, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Feb. 18, 2019, https://www.chronicle.com/interactives/Trend19InLoco-Main.
74 K.B. Melear, From In Loco Parentis to Consumerism: A Legal Analysis of the Contractual Relationship
Between Institution and Student, 40 NASPA J. 124 (2003).
75 Douglas J. Goodman & Susan S. Silbey, Defending Liberal Education from the Law, in LAW IN THE
LIBERAL ARTS 23 (Austin Sarat ed., 2004).
76 To be sure, viewing the university/student relationship as a business transaction may prove
problematic in all sorts of contexts other than only at faith-based institutions. For a discussion of
these issues in others contexts, see Andrew Little et al., Intellectual Property Issues Arising from Business
Ideas Generated by Undergraduate Students, 23 S. L.J. 249, 258–59 (2013).
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sense at religious universities that the student is not merely a transactional
consumer of academic credits or a tenant in institutional housing, but rather part
of something metaphysical and more caring.
The language of caring extends beyond students to other employees in these
kinds of institutions. At Abilene Christian University (the authors’ own
institution), the HR department has its own stated mission: “Live generously and
graciously toward others, the way God lives toward you.” 80 Yet the employment
relationship in American organizations (both religious and nonreligious) is shot
through with legality and pervasive regulation, and it is hard to live generously
and graciously with other employees when the law provides a structure and
rigidity that are premised on human estrangement and alienation from one
another. In universities, near total juridification has occurred, of which Title IX
and Senate Bill 212 are classic examples. As interpreted and applied by Goodman
and Silbey, juridification is “first, the attempt to apply formal laws to situations
that inherently depend on flexible, informal social interactions and, second, the
tendency of these laws to be treated as reified social facts rather than moral
accomplishments.” 81 In some ways, like the university/student relationship, the
university/employee relationship is highly regulated and legislated, resulting in
rigidity and formality that some employees at faith-based institutions (and
perhaps secular institutions as well) find stifling and problematic. The
organizational ethos at such places is sometimes at odds with the juridified
structure that overlays the employment relationship.
While we appreciate that universities generally care for their students, the
metaphysical aspect of faith-based higher education creates additional
expectations of all parties to the relationship. When the relationship between a
faith-based university and its students and employees is characterized by care,
service, and love, a vague pastoral atmosphere is created (intentionally or not),
which differs in some respects from typical university relationships. One aspect
of the implied pastoral role includes an emphasis on openness, confession,
contrition, forgiveness, and redemption, all of which are explored below, and that
raise questions in the current context about privileged communications between
students and pastors or clergy.
In their discussion of organizational cultures at Christian universities,
Obenchain, Johnson, and Dion found that most faith-based institutions have a
“clan”-type culture. In such organizations, the rhetoric of family is used often, and
organizational values include trust, loyalty, empowerment, and collegiality. 82
Rightly or wrongly, a legal requirement to report activities that could be sexual
misconduct may put an employee at odds with institutional values of loyalty,
trust, and collegiality. It signals that an employee is not part of the clan/family.
To be clear, an employee who has knowledge of clear sexual misconduct has an
ethical duty to report, even if it results in being ostracized in a tight-knit college
community that emphasizes loyalty. But many cases are not obvious, as noted in
Abilene
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U.,
Human
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Dep’t,
Our
Mission,
https://www.acu.edu/community/offices/hr-finance/hr/mission.html [June 24, 2020 (apparently
based on The Message’s rendering of Matthew 5:48).
81 Goodman & Silbey, supra note 74, at 21.
82 A.M. Obenchain et al., Institutional Types, Organizational Cultures, and Innovation in Christian
Colleges and Universities, 3 CHRISTIAN HIGHER EDUC. 15, 32 (2004).
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the hypotheticals throughout this article, and these harder cases create a bind for
conscientious employees faced with uncertain facts. Employees seek to be loyal to
the clan both because they agree with the institutional mission and because they
want to keep their jobs, but learn about a situation that, depending on unknown
factors, could be sexual misconduct. Yet the employees feel that their knowledge
of all possible facts is incomplete, and they cannot presently make an informed
judgment about whether reporting is required. Should an employee report all
suspicions and let the Title IX office on campus handle the details? Or should the
employee inquire further of the student or coworker who first raised the issue? At
what point does an employee’s duty to conduct a private investigation under
Texas Senate Bill 212 become unreasonable?
It is important to note that some faith-based institutions have failed to
create cultures that are amenable to reporting sexual misconduct, and as a result,
the state stepped in to require reporting, backed by severe penalties. This is not
limited to universities, obviously, given the numerous high-profile failings in
denominational settings to root out sexual abuse and misconduct. Organizations
built around metaphysical faith commitments, secrecy, hierarchy, and loyalty can
be the most egregious perpetrators of institutional harm. Recognizing these
tendencies, Texas understandably reacted strongly to limit institutional and
employee prerogative. At the other end of the spectrum, and in a remarkable
move that potentially reinforces the clannish commitments to secrecy and loyalty
in religious organizations, some states are even allowing churches to create their
own licensed police departments. 83 These statutory changes may allow religious
groups to cover up crimes committed by their members through the use of
authoritative state-backed law enforcement officials handling complaints
discretely and privately, rather than in an open and publicly transparent process.
A healthier approach would be for religious schools to reassess their cultures
based upon the realization that an organizational ethos built on privacy instead of
accountability, blame instead of listening, forgiveness instead of justice, and
loyalty instead healing can do greater long-term harm to the parties, the university
community, and society at large. 84
B. Senate Bill 212 Raises Privilege Concerns in Faith-Based Institutions
The Texas statute requiring the report of sexual misconduct carves out a limited
exception for privileged communications. As an exception to the general
reporting rule requirement, Texas Education Code section 51.252(c) provides that
a university employee “who receives information regarding such an incident
ALA. CODE § 16-22-1(a) (rev. 2019); see also Richard Gonzalez, New Alabama Law Permits Church to
Hire Its Own Police Force, NPR, June 20, 2019, https://www.npr.org/2019/06/20/734591147/newalabama-law-permits-church-to-hire-its-own-police-force.
84 One alternative approach in this regard is restorative justice practices (See e.g., Harper, S., Maskaly
et al., Enhancing Title IX Due Process Standards in Campus Sexual Assault Adjudication: Considering the
Roles of Distributive, Procedural, and Restorative Justice, 16 J. SCH. VIOLENCE 302 (2017). While formal
hearings, like those contemplated by the new Title IX regulations may be required (and preferred)
in some cases, restorative justice approaches provide the parties with alternatives focused on
acknowledging wrongdoing and addressing personal harms. As opposed to private internal
processes or top-down punitive approaches controlled by the government or institutions, restorative
justice approaches acknowledge “the need [for victims] to tell the story of their experiences, obtain
answers to questions, experience validation, observe offender remorse, receive support that
counteracts self-blame, and have input into the resolution of their violation.” Id. at 312.
83
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under circumstances that render the employee's communications confidential or
privileged under other law shall, in making a report under this section, state only
the type of incident reported and may not include any information that would
violate a student's expectation of privacy.” Yet knowing the boundaries of what
counts as confidential or privileged information and relationships may not be easy
to establish. As an example, consider the following hypothetical situation.
Hypothetical Example #4
The university has a tenured professor of religion who is also a part-time
pastor at a local church. A student has visited the church from time to time
and enjoyed meeting the faculty member, and then the student signed up for
one of the professor/pastor’s elective religion classes his senior year in the
hopes of learning more about the subject and perhaps even out of a desire for
spiritual fulfillment. As the semester progresses, the student confesses to the
professor/pastor to having been peripherally involved in an incident that
occurred his freshman year, where consent may have been questionable in a
sexual encounter. The other students involved, the primary alleged offender
and the putative victim, have both graduated and are no longer part of the
university community. Must the professor/pastor report the incident under
Texas Senate Bill 212, including the identity of the confessing student, or just
that an incident occurred but not reveal the students’ identities, or should the
university employee not report at all given that the activity arguably may not
have constituted sexual assault?
This hypothetical raises questions about whether the communication was
made to the employee in the employee’s ministerial capacity, such that a privilege
would apply. Texas law recognizes privileged communications in the following
relationships: lawyer/client, spousal testimony, clergy/communicant, political
vote, trade secret, informer’s identity, physician/patient (civil), mental health
professional/client (civil), and accountant/client. 85 While it is possible that
multiple privilege categories within the foregoing list might apply at many
universities, it is the discussion of the clergy/communicant relationship that is the
subject of this section, since this relationship could be implicated in faith-based
institutions.
Universities with faith affiliations may find that faculty and other
employees view their roles through a ministerial lens. The possibility that
professors or other staff could have ministerial roles is not merely abstract, given
the following scenarios:
1. In one realistic arrangement at some faith-based schools, religion
courses are taught by full-time faculty who may also hold part-time
ministerial or pastoral positions at churches.
85 TEX. R. EVID. 503 through 510. Note that the lawyer/client privilege is subject to a few limitations:
(1) it does not apply to communications if the lawyer’s services were sought to further a crime or
fraud; (2) it does not apply in will contests when the deceased communicated with the lawyer; (3) it
does not apply to cases involving claims against lawyers by clients or instances where the lawyer
attested to a document; and (4) it does not apply to situations involving joint representation.
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2. Another arrangement is for religion courses to be taught by adjunct
faculty whose primary occupations are ministry in churches. This
situation is compounded by the discussion, noted in Part II.A, related to
adjunct faculty who may not hold employment status with universities,
but rather are contract workers.
3. In addition, there are numerous faculty members (primarily at faithbased institutions but perhaps also at secular universities) who serve in
their churches in a diaconal capacity, and whose university jobs have
nothing to do with their religious work, but who view teaching and
research as their vocational ministry.
4. Finally, many religious schools have faculty who fit into all three of the
above categories.
In each of these examples, and perhaps in others not described, a statement to the
faculty member as contemplated by the statute raises questions about the clergy
privilege.
Texas Rule of Evidence 505(a)(1) defines a clergy member as “a minister, priest,
rabbi, accredited Christian Science Practitioner, or other similar functionary of a
religious organization or someone whom a communicant reasonably believes is a
clergy member.” Communicant, in turn, is defined to mean “a person who
consults a clergy member in the clergy member’s professional capacity as a
spiritual advisor.” 86 There is no requirement that the clergy member be a full-time,
ordained minister or religious functionary. And the allowance for clergy status to
be established only through the communicant’s perceptions or reasonable beliefs
likewise supports an expansive view of the clergy role. This being the case,
certainly the first two examples noted in the preceding paragraph, and maybe
even the third example, all create possibilities at universities where
clergy/communicant relationships could be formed.
The clergy privilege has historical roots tracing back to the middle ages,
but its status in post-Reformation England and then the early American republic
was tenuous. 87 Seventeenth- and eighteenth-century courts tended to view the
privilege as arising from Catholic confession—which was true insofar as it goes—
and with the Reformation doing away with the sacrament and requirement of
confession, the privilege lost its legal sanction. There were numerous instances on
both sides of the Atlantic when courts refused to apply the privilege to
communications between clergy and communicants, often in cases where the
clergy member was Protestant, rather than Catholic. 88 It is only in the twentieth
century that a large plurality of states adopted clergy privileges by statute or rule
of evidence that apply to ministers and communicants of all faiths. 89
Historically, the clergy privilege has been asserted by two different parties:
the communicant, and the clergy member. In Texas, the privilege may be claimed
by the communicant, or by the clergy member acting on the communicant’s
behalf. 90 Assertions by communicants are made for obvious reasons: they seek to
TEX. R. EVID. 505(a)(2).
Jacob Yellin, The History and Current Status of the Clergy-Penitent Privilege, 23 SANTA CLARA L. REV.
95, 101–08 (1983).
88 Id. at 104–06.
89 Id.
90 TEX. R. EVID. 505(c).
86
87
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have the incriminating communication excluded from evidence, which would be
more likely to result in punishment. Clergy are increasingly less likely to claim
the privilege, using a host of justifications for why they can testify against
communicants. 91 For instance, clergy members might refuse to use the privilege
as a shield when they believe their conversations with the communicant were not
carried out in their ministerial capacities or when they do not believe the
communicant’s confession or communication were sincerely made for the purpose
of seeking spiritual guidance. Christine Bartholomew suggests in her empirical
review of the literature that the clergy privilege is in decline, but it is largely based
on ministers declining to claim protection, rather than courts forcing them to
testify over objection. “Consciously or otherwise, and most notably in violent
crime cases, clergy share confidences that are facially protected under broad state
statutory language. Thus, the clergy’s interpretation of the privilege is
contributing to its decline.” 92
Clergy are more likely to claim the privilege when they determine that to
testify against the communicant would unacceptably expose them to occupational
and spiritual consequences. In other words, given that confession in a Catholic
church is both required as a church sacrament and sealed by secrecy, it is no
surprise that priests appear more likely to refuse to disclose the confidences of
their penitents. 93 To do so could result in discipline and excommunication. 94
Indeed, numerous Catholic priests in history are martyrs to the seal of confession,
preferring execution at the hands of the authorities rather than reveal the
substance of confessions. 95
Protestant churches appear less likely to discipline ministers for revealing
parishioner communications, probably for the reason that both the role of clergy
and the act of confession are less defined and regimented by denominational
doctrine or church rule. In addition, for many independent Protestant churches,
there is no ministerial discipline possible beyond the level of the individual
church. Finally, there are instances where churches themselves affirmatively state
that they recognize no privilege within their religious fellowship. An example of
this last category is the 2008 Texas case of Leach v. State, where a member of a
Church of Christ made statements both in an open congregational setting and later
in private to church elders about a murder. Both the church elders and the
defendant’s own father testified that there is no expectation of privacy in
confessions, based on the denomination’s reluctance to claim a clergy privilege. 96

Christine Bartholomew, Exorcising the Clergy Privilege, 103 Va. L. Rev. 1015 (2017).
Id. at 1018 (internal citations omitted).
93 Code of Canon Law 983 § 1 states, “The sacramental seal is inviolable; therefore it is absolutely
forbidden for a confessor to betray in any way a penitent in words or in any manner and for any
reason.” Note that the terms “confessor” and “penitent” are roughly equivalent to “clergy” and
“communicant,” respectively. And continuing, Canon Law 984 § 1 states, “A confessor is prohibited
completely from using knowledge acquired from confession to the detriment of the penitent even
when any danger of revelation is excluded.”
94
See, e.g., Dan Harris, Priest Kept Secret of Murder, ABC NEWS, July 25, 2001,
https://abcnews.go.com/WNT/story?id=130794&page=1.
95 Catholic News Agency, These Priests Were Martyred for Refusing to Violate the Seal of Confession, Dec.
6, 2017, https://www.catholicnewsagency.com/news/these-priests-were-martyred-for-refusingto-violate-the-seal-of-confession-44847.
96 Leach v. State, 2008 Tex. App. Lexis 6684, *5 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Sept. 4, 2008).
91
92
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In her recent analysis, Bartholomew suggests that because legislatures
drew clergy privilege statutes in mostly absolute terms, ministers are pushed “to
act as quasi-legislators, articulating boundaries that reflect canonical and judicial
ends.” 97 Thus, clergy actively and carefully circumscribe the boundaries of their
professional relationships with communicants, likely testifying when necessary to
preserve some greater good and prevent the imposition of injustice.
Bartholomew’s suggestion is that clergy themselves are uncomfortable with an
absolute privilege. 98
As Senate Bill 212 is applied to faith-affiliated institutions, a claim of
privilege could arise in at least two ways. First, student communicants who are
seeking spiritual advice from their minister/professors could confess facts in a
clergy context, and the student communicants could claim the privilege and
prevent reporting of the information because the students seek to avoid discipline
or prosecution. Second, an institution could determine that faculty members did
not report incidents of sexual misconduct originally discovered by them under
clergy privilege circumstances, and the faculty members could claim the
protections of the privilege to defend themselves in both their employment
termination and criminal prosecution. This second situation seems more akin to
the classic cases of Catholic priests refusing to break the seal of confession because
of concerns arising from their greater loyalty to Canon Law and the church. If
Bartholomew is correct, and clergy police the boundaries of the privilege based on
the circumstances of every case, then this is yet another area where the outcome of
a disciplinary proceeding will rest entirely on unique facts and circumstances.
There will be no easy resolution of clergy privilege cases at faith-based institutions
under Senate Bill 212.
C.

The Course and Scope Requirement Is Not Clear

As noted above, the employees of the institution must have received the
information related to the sexual misconduct in the course and scope of their
employment. 99 The statute itself does not define this phrase, but regulations in the
Texas Administrative Code indicate that course and scope of employment means
“an employee performing duties in the furtherance of the institution’s interests.” 100
For most universities, this likely is a simple matter to determine, because the vast
majority of employees in higher education institutions are advancing the school’s
interests almost by definition. But for faith-based schools, is an employee who
also serves in some ministerial capacity at a religious organization acting “in
furtherance of the institution’s interests” when the person hears or otherwise
discovers the sexual misconduct? Or is the employee engaging in a pastoral
discussion with someone that does not further the institution’s interests? Making
this determination is yet another fact and context-specific inquiry, as discussed in
Part II.A. and B.. However, the following example shows how complicated this
issue could be for some employees.
Hypothetical Example #5
Bartholomew, supra note 90, at 1048.
Id. at 1051.
99 TEX. EDUC. CODE § 51.252(a) (2020).
100 19 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.3(b).
97
98
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At a religious university, faculty and staff participate along with students in yearly
Spring Break service trips to national and international locations. Faculty and staff
use vacation time to attend the trips, but some academic departments cover the
cost of the trips to encourage faculty to attend. During the course of an
international trip, groups meet each night to pray and talk about their days.
Following one of these gatherings, a student reveals to a university employee
member that her roommate, another student at the university, who is not on the
trip, told the student that she had been sexually assaulted last semester but made
it clear she does not want anyone else to know. Does Texas Senate Bill 212 legally
require the staff member to report the information to the university’s Title IX
office? Even if technically on vacation, is the employee performing duties in the
furtherance of the institution’s interests? 101
One concern about employees acting in these off-duty, university-encouraged
arrangements is that the employees’ intent and subjective understanding when
receiving the communication will likely be a factor. And presumably the
employee will testify that the conversation with the person providing the
information was not in furtherance of the institution’s interests. This situation,
like several other examples noted in this article, will create issues for the trier of
fact to determine.
IV.

CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS

Texas Senate Bill 212 is the product of good intentions, but it will be
problematic to apply to many ordinary university situations, as this article has
sought to portray. To conclude our critique of the statute, we offer the following
suggestions to administrators, in terms of creating clarity under the current statute
as written, and to legislators, in terms of amending the statute in the next
legislative session.
1. Administrators Should Create Due Process Protections—Employees at all
universities—public and private—who are threatened with termination for
failure to report should be afforded basic due process rights, including
provisions for an evidentiary hearing and an organizational jury of their peers.
Therefore, universities should modify existing university policies or create a
new policy related to termination decisions for failing to report, especially for
faculty and other contract employees (i.e., athletic coaches). Without such
changes, the university may be forced to decide between violating its existing
policies related to termination or being subject to legal violation and related
fines from the state.
2. Administrators Could Expand Confidential Employees—Both the new Title
IX regulations and existing Texas law allows universities to identify an
unlimited number of confidential employees. While most universities
typically only designate specific roles like medical care providers or full-time
While new Title IX regulations clarify that Title IX does not apply extraterritorially, this question
is not concerned with Title IX, but Texas requirements. Moreover, based on the provided scenario,
there is no indication where or in what context the assault occurred. If it occurred on campus, then
Title IX would still apply regardless if the initial report was made while abroad.
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chaplains, universities could expand that approach by naming all faculty in
certain institutional divisions (such as the seminary or school of theology) as
confidential employees, which would still require faculty to report
nonidentifiable information about the alleged sexual misconduct.
3. University Leaders Should Reinforce Organizational Values that Support
Reporting—As noted earlier in this article, some of the problems the Texas
Legislature sought to combat arise from the insular, private cultures at faithbased institutions that emphasize loyalty and commitment to metaphysical
missions. While these may be valid attributes, surely the same universities
could also emphasize values like organizational transparency and supporting
victims of sexual misconduct, whether through informal resolution or formal
grievance processes. If universities can help solve the problem—by focusing
on accountability, listening, justice, and healing—then the legislation becomes
less necessary.
4. Legislators Should Revise Reporting Standards Similar to the Clery Act or
the new Title IX—While Texas is often willing to buck national trends, it
should consider other legislative reporting regimes, which are informed not
by a one-size-fits-all approach, but by content experts and the universities
impacted by the law. For example, Texas could adopt the long-standing Clery
Act approach, which only requires CSAs, not all employees, to pass along
nonidentifiable information that they receive as a direct report from a student
(as opposed to indirect information and rumors) or it could adopt an even
lesser burden established by the new Title IX regulations, which require only
Title IX administrators or those with power to enforce corrective measures to
report. Such a change would allow the majority of teaching faculty to serve in
a role of supporter and not reporter, while giving the universities discretion in
terms of who it designates mandatory reporters.
5. Legislators Should Adopt the Clery Act Approach to Institutional Fines and
University Control of Employee Discipline—A significant defect in the
statute is the severe penalty for failures to report, given the highly contextual
and fact-dependent nature of sexual misconduct in many instances. Requiring
ordinary university employees to discern if what they learned or overheard
fits the statute’s definitions for various types of misconduct poses challenges
in many instances, as noted in the hypothetical scenarios described above. In
each of these instances, however, the failure to report leads to required
termination and prosecution of the employee, and a significant fine for the
university (up to $2 million). A better approach would be to maintain the
university-level fine, and then allow the university to punish the employee
through a for-cause termination (which would supersede an employment
contract or tenured status) but not mandate termination.
6. Legislators Should Consult Title IX Coordinators, Faculty and Students
Impacted by these Requirements—In the 2021 Texas Legislative Session,
legislators should consider amending these mandatory reporting
requirements after discussing their impact and challenges with key
stakeholders. By talking to these groups, they will not only understand the
challenges presented by these new mandatory reporting requirements but
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better appreciate what type of requirements and approaches would be most
effective in eliminating sexual misconduct. 102
7. Legislators Should Clarify Whether the Reporting Obligations Are
Retroactive or Only Apply Prospectively to New Information—As noted
previously, the statute has no time limit on an employee’s reporting obligation.
The employee could have learned of some incident years or decades
previously, which may not have been resolved at the time. Does the statute
require past knowledge to be reported? Or does the statute only apply to new
knowledge learned by employees after its effective date? Moreover, what are
the expectations of employees to report incidents where the statute of
limitations has long since run, or the people involved have left the university
community, or the university has no way to address or remediate the situation
for various reasons? This lack of clarity as to timeframes needs legislative
attention. At a minimum, the Legislature should state whether the reporting
obligation applies to past knowledge or only new knowledge.
Texas Senate Bill 212 is an important and well-intentioned attempt to solve
several serious problems. In the process, however, the law creates new problems
that need attention by legislators and university administrators. Some of these
new quandaries are more acutely felt by faith-based universities, which, candidly,
have not always manifested the kinds of healthy campus cultures they claim to
have. Jointly, campus administrators and legislators can each work in their
respective spheres to make a new way forward.

While the Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board adopted administrative rules related to
the current statute with input from some Title IX Coordinators and university legal counsel, that
work focused on how to operationalize the current law, not how to improve it.
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